Several studies of presidential elections have confirmed Key's hy pothesis (Abramson, Aldrich, & Rohde 1982 , 1986 , 1990 Fiorina 1981; Miller & Wattenberg 1985) , but it has not been tested in presidential pri maries. The purpose of this study is to determine whether retrospective voting occurs in presidential primaries. It considers whether voters who participated in 1976 Republican and in 1980 Democratic primaries cast retrospective votes. 1 The results reported here are of interest for several reasons. First, the nomination process determines "the kind of person who [will] occupy the White House" (Ranney 1977, 7) . Since presidential primaries are central to that process, how primary voters decide warrants greater atten tion than it has received. Second, how primary voters decide may be af fected by the contextual differences between in-party and out-party nomi nation contests (Geer 1989) . It is important to know whether these differ ences affect how primary voters decide. Third, hypothesis validation, though less valuable than hypothesis creation, is a legitimate scientific purpose. This study considers whether Key's hypothesis provides a good explanation of candidate choice in a different electoral setting. Finally, persuasive evidence in support of the retrospective hypothesis could re solve some theoretical anomalies. The literature suggests that presiden tial primaries are determined either by idiosyncratic factors (Norrander 1986) or by a universal factor called momentum (Bartels 1988) . The for mer argument makes discovering a general theory difficult, if not impos sible. The latter hypothesis, which argues that primary voters simply jump on the bandwagon of the apparent winner, seems antithetical to many basic tenets of democratic theory. Retrospective voting could be the missing link, a general factor that is consistent with democratic the ory.
Do presidential primary voters vote retrospectively? If so, under what conditions? Primary voters are more likely to vote retrospectively when two conditions are present: (1) an unpopular incumbent is seeking his party's nomination for another term and (2) a viable challenger is trying to block that nomination by criticizing the incumbent's perform ance. These conditions were present in the 1976 Republican contest be tween President Gerald Ford and Ronald Reagan and in the 1980 Demo cratic contest between President Jimmy Carter and Senator Edward (Ted) Kennedy (Pomper 1977 (Pomper , 1981 .
The Nomination Contests
After Vice President Spiro Agnew resigned in October, 1973 to avoid the publicity of a trial, House Minority Leader Gerald Ford was nominated and confirmed as Nixon's second Vice President. In August, 1974, after Nixon had resigned under threat of impeachment, Ford be came the first unnominated and unelected president. Soon after taking the oath of office, Ford granted Nixon an unconditional pardon. "The ob vious conclusion,' ' Witcover (1977) notes, was that "Ford had struck a deal to gain the presidency, that he had agreed before assuming office to pardon Nixon if he would step aside" (43). Ford's approval rating imme diately declined from 66 percent to 50 percent. When Reagan officially announced his challenge in November, 1975, Ford's approval rating had dropped to 41 percent (Gallup 1975) . 2 Although the Camp David agreement between Egypt and Israel was a success, Carter's handling of other crises eroded his approval rating. Carter's responses to Soviet aggression in Afghanistan-suspending grain sales, boycotting the Olympic games, reinstituting registration for the draft, and deferring Senate action on an arms control treaty-were in effective and, to some extent, politically unpopular. While Americans endured the economic hardships caused by gasoline shortages and double-digit inflation, unemployment, and interest rates, Carter blamed these problems on a "crisis of confidence.'' When Kennedy officially an nounced his challenge in November, 1979, Carter's approval rating had dropped to 29 percent and Democrats preferred Kennedy by a two-to-one margin (Polsby 1981a) . The Iranian hostage crisis, which also began in November, 1979, and Kennedy's personal liabilities and disorganized campaign helped Carter come back against Kennedy.
Both intraparty challenges afforded voters an opportunity to vote retrospectively in a context wherein incumbent performance was at issue, and competitive alternatives were available. In each case, the challengers criticized the incumbents' performance. Reagan maintained after losing the Illinois primary that "the fact that I have won something over forty [percent] of the vote . . . indicates there is major dissatisfaction in our party with the kind of leadership it has been receiving'' (Witcover 1977, 408) . Soon after Carter's "malaise speech,'' Kennedy retorted, "We want action, not excuses . . . leadership that inspires people, not leadership that . . . blames people for malaise'' (Germond & Witcover 1981, 55) . In the end, Reagan won 46 percent of the two-candidate primary vote and his final delegate total of 1,070 was 95 percent of the total number needed for nomination (Moore and Fraser 1977; Pomper 1977 )-the closest rcnomination contest for an incumbent President since 1884 (Kecch and Matthews 1977) . The 1980 Democratic contest, although not as close, was also competitive. Kennedy got 42 percent of the two-candidate pri mary vote and his final delegate total of 1,221.8 was 74 percent of the to tal number needed for nomination (Moore 1981) .
Rival Hypotheses and Test Variables
Whether primary voters actually did vote retrospectively in these races requires not only evidence on the relationship between performance variables and votes cast, but also control of rival hypotheses. Aldrich 59 (1980) and Brams (1978) , for example, argue that primary voters cast is sue votes. Though a few studies have reported evidence that supports this hypothesis (e.g., Bartels 1985) , many more have reported evidence that contradicts it (Abramowitz 1989; Geer 1989; Gopoian 1982; Keeter and Zukin 1983; Marshall 1984; Norrander 1986; Wattier 1983a Wattier , 1983b Williams, Weber, Haaland, Mueller, and Craig 1976) . Nevertheless, there are at least two valid reasons to include issues. First, classical democratic theory places such a premium on issue voting that every op portunity to test for it should be taken (Schumpeter 1950, ch. 21) . Sec ond, studies of presidential primaries have yet to exhaust all the possible ways of studying issue voting (Asher 1988) . RePass (1971) , for ex ample, divided his 1960 and 1964 samples of presidential voters into is sue publics-different groups of respondents who had expressed an inter est in the same issue-which he concluded did not vote on the basis of those issues. This study will thus control for different issue publics. Jewell (1974) has argued that candidate images, created with so phisticated campaign techniques, determine candidate choice in primary elections:
The structure of the presidential primary system makes it possible for a candidate to win primaries if he has a strong organization, plenty of funds, shrewd advisers, an appealing campaign style, and a good image on television (282).
In fact, subsequent research shows that affective images have had a stronger effect than electability (Norrander 1986; Abramowitz 1987 Abramowitz , 1989 , a stronger effect than ideology (Marshall 1984; Norrander 1986; Wattier 1983a) , and a stronger effect than issues (Marshall 1984; Norran der 1986; Williams et al. 1976) . It, therefore, is essential that candidate images be controlled.
Candidate electability, an image trait, could also influence candi date choice (Aldrich 1980) . Primary voters may support the candidate who they believe has the best chance of winning the November general election (Abramowitz, McGlennon, & Rapoport 1981; Bartels 1988; Norrander 1986 ). As Abramowitz (1989) has recently concluded, "In choosing a candidate for their party's nomination, Republican and Demo cratic primary voters weighed electability in addition to their general evaluations of the candidates seeking the nomination'' (988). Electability is, therefore, a theoretically important factor that should be controlled.
Primaries are usually contests among leaders representing different ideological factions of a party. Reagan's challenge was motivated not only by Ford's poor performance but also by Reagan's support among the GOP's right wing (Witcover 1977 ). Carter's failure to pursue a lib eral policy agenda was one reason Kennedy, the acknowledged leader of the Democrat's left wing, entered the race (White 1982) . When parties are divided into ideological factions, each faction's candidate can be ex pected to make an ideological appeal for votes (Polsby 1981b) . Two re cent studies have suggested that primary voters respond to those appeals. In the first investigation, Wattier (1983b) , who studied four 1980 Repub lican primaries, concluded, "When primary voters perceive a difference in candidate ideologies, they generally support the candidate closer to their own ideology '' (1023-1024) . In the second work, Norrander (1 9 8 8 )-who studied primary elections in 1976, 1980, and 1984-re ported that ideological voting varies across primaries. Thus, it is neces sary to control for voter ideology in the contests examined here. Most states, as Carr and Scott (1984) have noted, "require voters to state a party affiliation on registration to be eligible to vote in a party pri mary election'' (470). However, lax administration of primary laws, jux taposed with the dramatic rise in the number of independents since the 1960s, could create variation in the partisanship of primary voters. Al though the National Democratic Party had mandated "closed" primaries, some states (e.g., Wisconsin and Montana) were granted exceptions, and some enforce partisan affiliation only by asking voters to publicly request a primary ballot, a procedure that could transform a de jure closed pri mary into a de facto open primary (Jewell 1983) . Variation could also occur in Republican primaries because the GOP has not required its state parties to close their "primary doors" to independents. Since variation is thus possible, it seems prudent to control for the effects of party identifi cation (Fiorina 1981) . 3 Marshall's study (1984) of 1980 Democratic and Republican prima ries has shown that demographic characteristics also need to be con trolled. His discriminant analysis of several variables, including an index of demographic variables, revealed that although candidate-personality emerged as the best single predictor of candidate choice, the demographic index also improved vote predictions as much or more than did ideology, domestic policy issues, and foreign policy issues, among others. Since education and income were included in Marshall's index, socioeconomic status, a concept often measured with these two variables (Conway 1991) , is the final test variable in this study.4
Data and Measures
The data are from CBS News /New York Times exit polls for thirteen presidential primaries: the 1976 Republican primaries in Florida, Massa chusetts, and New Hampshire and the 1980 Democratic primaries in California, Florida, Illinois, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jer sey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin.5 Primary voters, chosen randomly just after they had voted, were given a pencil and a questionnaire with roughly fifty closed-ended questions which they were instructed to answer by marking the appropriate boxes of the question naire (Levy 1983).6
The dependent variable was measured with an item that listed the possible vote choices. In 1976 three choices were listed: "Gerald Ford," "Ronald Reagan," and "Other." In 1980, "Jimmy Carter," "Edward Ken nedy," and a few minor candidates (e.g., Edmund Brown and Lyndon LaRouche) were listed. So few votes were cast for minor candidates that those responses were treated as missing data. The dependent variable here is thus dichotomous: a vote for Ford, or for Reagan, in the 1976 pri maries; a vote for Carter, or for Kennedy, in the 1980 primaries. The number and the content of the issue items varied greatly across the thirteen questionnaires. The problem of how to create an equivalent measure from these different protocols was solved with cluster analysis Issue publics were operationally defined in separate cluster analyses of the issue items in each questionnaire.8 This technique assigned respon dents who had similar issue positions to the same cluster (Kachigan 1982, ch. 8) . Respondents were divided into three issue publics to avoid the "vanishing-cases" problem. Because of the way it was constructed, each scale only applies to a sample-specific subset of respondents. This characteristic presents no special problems since the analytical focus is on the relative effects of variables within, not between, samples.
Electability and other candidate traits were measured by one item (cf. Norrander 1986). Respondents were asked, "Which of these qualities best describes why you voted for your candidate today?" This item was followed by a list of traits. In most surveys respondents could choose electability: "He has the best chance to win in November." The other traits were classified as either political-role traits (experience, strong leader, etc.) or as personal-style traits (cares, honesty, etc.), following the taxonomy advanced by Nimmo and Savage (1976) . Responses to this question were transformed into dummy variables indicating whether electability, political role, or personal style were selected as a reason for a respondent's choice. Creating these test variables thus permits control of respondents' decision criteria.
Voter ideology and party identification were defined operationally with two self-identification items. Each questionnaire asked voters to complete the phrase, "On most political matters do you consider yourself ________" by checking "Liberal" or "Moderate" or "Conservative." Voters were also asked to complete the phrase, "Do you usually think of yourself a s ________" by checking "Republican" or "Democrat" or "In dependent."
A socioeconomic-status (SES) index was created from respondents' education, income, and occupation for 1976 primaries, and from educa tion and income in 1980 (occupation was not measured in the latter year). Each variable was standardized and then summed, creating an additive index with equal weight given to each variable. The higher the score, the higher the socioeconomic status, and vice versa (see Nie, Verba, and Petrocik 1979) .
Results
Evidence to support the hypothesis that ballots cast in 1976 Repub lican and 1980 Democratic primaries were retrospective votes is pre sented in Tables 1 through 7 . The first five tables display evidence from bivariate, crosstabulation analyses; the last two, evidence from multivari ate, regression and probit analyses. In each analysis the results for gen eral performance are presented before the results for specific perform ance. The data presentation thus flows from general to specific perform ance and from bivariate to multivariate analysis. Each of the lambda coefficients for the 1976 Republican prima ries-.72, .70, and .76 for Florida, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire, respectively-is twice as large as the lambda of .36 for the 1980 Florida Democratic primary. This difference emerges because Republican pri mary voters were more likely than Democratic primary voters to support a challenger when they disliked an incumbent's record. This difference does not negate the basic finding of retrospective voting. It simply sug gests that a challenger's viability may affect the degree to which retro spective voting occurs. Controlling ideology in the 1980 Florida Demo cratic sample appears to confirm the importance of challenger viability: numerous conservative Floridians could not bring themselves to vote for Kennedy, a northeastern liberal with questions in his past, even though they were displeased with Carter. Among those who disapproved of Car ter's performance, only 29 percent of those who were conservatives voted for Kennedy, compared to 92 percent of those who were liberals (and thus were more likely to regard Kennedy as a viable alternative).
General Performance
Controlling for ideology also illustrated the importance of incum bency. Liberals, moderates, and conservatives who approved of Carter's performance supported the president at rates of 90 percent, 93 percent, and 98 percent, respectively. The dramatically different lambda coeffi cients-.79, .37, and .00 for liberals, moderates, and conservatives, re spectively-also imply that ideology is intertwined with both viability and incumbency. Ideology, then, may be especially relevant when pri mary voters must decide whether to vote against an unpopular incum bent. For those who disapprove of the president's performance, it proba bly is easier to vote against him when a challenger is seen as a viable ideological alternative. Without a viable alternative, incumbency and ideology may reinforce a vote for the unpopular incumbent. Finally, the effect of ideology is totally suppressed among those primary voters who approve of the president and believe "one good term deserves another."
Specific Performance
Economic performance. Analysis of voters' evaluations of Carter's economic performance in nine 1980 Democratic primaries yields results that clearly fit the hypothesized pattern. An average of 91 percent of vot ers who rated Carter's economic performance positively cast ballots for the president, whereas an average of nearly 70 percent of those who dis liked the president's economic record registered their disapproval by vot ing for Senator Kennedy (see Table 2 ).
The lambda coefficients for these primaries average .42. The only primaries with lambda coefficients well below this average are Illinois and Wisconsin. In both states, approximately 40 percent of the voters who should have been likely to support the challenger, according to the retrospective hypothesis, actually cast votes for Carter. These unex pected findings again seem related to voters' reservations about Senator Kennedy. Controlling for electability and personal style reveals that only 26 percent of the voters who were dissatisfied with Carter's economic record but based their decisions on electability, and 40 percent of those who were dissatisfied but based their decisions on personal style, cast votes for Kennedy. When voters based their decisions on factors other than electability or personal style, Kennedy got 65 percent of the votes of those who were unhappy with President Carter. One inference is that many Illinois voters did not believe Kennedy possessed the requisite po litical assets. Another inference is that Carter's personal style and per ceived electability or advantage of incumbency were assets which per suaded some Illinois voters to support him despite their reservations about his record. Among those who approved of Carter's economic rec ord, nine out of ten supported the president even though electability and personal style were cited as important decision criteria.
As In short, the pattern observed in the 1980 Florida primary is re peated in both Illinois and Wisconsin. Only when voters evaluate presi dential performance negatively, thus summoning the possibility of voting against the incumbent, do other factors seem to enter primary voters' de cision calculus.
Foreign Policy Performance. Table 3 , which presents results for Carter's handling of foreign policy, provides further support for the retro spective hypothesis. In these six 1980 Democratic primaries an average of 85 percent of the voters who liked Carter's foreign-policy record cast ballots for the president. An average of 81 percent cast primary ballots for Kennedy when Carter's record was disliked.
The lambda coefficients average .59 for these six primaries; the co efficients for Illinois and Massachusetts-.45 and .48, respectively-are well below this average. In Illinois nearly a third of the voters expected to support Kennedy actually supported Carter. On the other hand, in Massachusetts, Kennedy's home state, nearly a third of those expected to support Carter actually supported Kennedy. A partial explanation for these anomalous findings may lie in the differential effects of electability and performance evaluations. Once again, controlling for electability suggests why some dissatis fied Illinois voters could not support Kennedy in the 1980 primary. Only 39 percent of those who were dissatisfied with Carter but based their de cisions on electability cast votes for Kennedy. In contrast, when voters displeased with Carter cited other voting decision criteria, Kennedy re ceived 65 percent of the votes.
Votes cast by Massachusetts voters who took electability into ac count split as expected: 86 percent who liked Carter's foreign policy supported him; 86 percent who disliked the incumbent's record supported the challenger. What appears to account for the low coefficient between foreign policy performance and the vote in the Massachusetts case is that among voters who based their decisions on other criteria, Kennedy won 32 percent of the ballots cast by voters pleased with Carter's handling of foreign policy. In short, Kennedy's favorite-son status probably works against the retrospective hypothesis in his home state.
Hostage Crisis Performance. The results for Carter's handling of the Iranian hostage crisis are summarized in Table 4 . These data show that approximately 80 percent of the voters who approved of Carter's per formance during this crisis voted for Carter. Approximately 80 percent of those who disapproved cast ballots for Kennedy. The average lambda score for these seven primaries is .52; three states-California, Massa chusetts, and New York-have coefficients slightly below this average. The unexpected findings of the Massachusetts primary have been ex plained in terms of Kennedy's home-state advantage. The findings for California and New York, though generally consistent with the retrospec tive hypothesis, may reflect that certain "defining events" had an effect on these two primaries. The U.S. ambassador's support for a United Nations measure de signed to deny Israel authority over Jerusalem may have had such an ef fect on the New York primary. As White (1982) Determining whether this event had a direct effect is difficult because the New York exit poll has no questions about the U.N. vote. If, however, we assume that measures of voter perceptions of candidates' politicalrole traits (e.g., strong leader, experience) tap into citizen concerns about leadership and direction, an indirect test is possible. Controlling for po litical role shows a dramatic effect Among voters who liked Carter's record and for whom political role was not a consideration, 84 percent cast votes for Carter. However, among those who liked his hostage-crisis record and for whom political role was important, only 49 percent cast primary ballots for Carter. Thus, although many liked his past handling of the hostage crisis, recent events-or the passage of time -may have caused them to question whether the president had the requisite leader ship ability to produce positive results in the near future.
Controlling for religion as well as political role further illuminates the effect of the U.N. vote on Jewish voters in New York. For non-Jewish voters who approved of Carter's record on Iran, 27 points separate Carter's vote share among those who voted on the basis of political role and those who did not. Among Jewish voters who approved of Carter's crisis management, this gap grows to 50 percentage points: Carter re ceived 74 percent of the votes of Jewish voters who did not consider po litical role versus only 24 percent of the vote from those who did. In short, New York voters who were concerned about President Carter's leadership ability, especially Jewish voters, were much less likely to vote retrospectively.
The slightly lower coefficient for California may show that such questions about Carter's leadership were, if anything, heightened follow ing the failed attempt to rescue the hostages on 23 April 1980. The Cali fornia, New Jersey, and Ohio primaries occurred slightly more than a month after that aborted mission, and since the delegate selection process was nearly complete and few doubts remained as to who would win the nomination, voters in those three states were well situated to express their doubts about Carter's leadership ability.
Controlling for political role makes an indirect test of this hypothe sis possible. The results presented in Table 5 suggest partial support for it. Eighty-one percent of California voters who approved of Carter's hos tage crisis record and who cited decision criteria other than political role voted for Carter. Slightly higher percentages of like-minded voters in the other two late primaries also gave Carter their support. Voters who liked the president's record and who cited political role as a decision criterion were much less likely to support Carter: 56 percent in California, 76 per- cent in New Jersey, and 74 percent in Ohio. These percentages were lower by 25, 12, and 17 points, respectively, for those states. In short, reservations about Carter's leadership ability seemed to have the most effect in California, but also had some effect, to a lesser but significant degree, in New Jersey and Ohio.
Multivariate Analysis
The presentation of findings thus far has discussed the results for all possible bivariate, performance-vote relationships. Selected test vari ables have been incorporated only if they seemed to explain either unex pected findings or moderate-to-weak relationships.
To determine whether the effects of performance variables persist even after all test variables are controlled, multivariate regression and probit analyses9 were conducted. Tables 6 and 7 present these results for general-performance and specific-performance variables, respectively. Table 6 reports multivariate results for three 1976 Republican pri maries and for one 1980 Democratic primary for which a general measure of performance was available. The beta weights for general-performance evaluations in 1976 primaries are .75, .77, and .73 for Florida, Massachu setts, and New Hampshire, respectively. Comparing these coefficients to those of the other factors shows that general evaluations of Ford's per formance were obviously the most important determinant of votes cast in these 1976 Republican primaries. The effects of performance evaluations seem to have been at least three times greater than the effects of any other vote determinant.
The beta weight for evaluations of Carter's performance in the 1980 Florida primary is .52. Comparing all the beta weights shows that per formance was easily the most important correlate of votes cast, and is more than twice as large as the next largest beta weight of .21 for ideol ogy. The only other variable for which the beta weights are statistically significant in all four primaries is political role. In three primaries the beta weights are significant for ideology; in two primaries, for issue pub lics. In only one primary each are electability and personal style of sig nificant beta weight.
Another way to analyze the effects of these variables is to compare how well they predict votes. Performing two probit analyses-one with all independent variables and a second with only performance vari ables-makes an interesting comparison possible. Subtracting the per cent predicted correctly in the second probit analysis from the percent predicted in the first provides a measure of how much (if any) predictive power non-performance variables have added.
The results of this comparison, reported at the bottom of Table 6 , suggest that non-performance factors make varied contributions. In the 1980 Florida Democratic primary non-performance factors improve pre dictive power by 6.7 percentage points. However, in the 1976 Florida Republican primary these factors lessen predictive power by 0.7 points. In the 1976 Massachusetts primary predictive power is increased by 1.7 points. Finally, in the 1976 New Hampshire primary non-performance factors add nothing to the predictive power achieved solely by the gen eral-performance variable. Thus, in all four analyses most of the predic tive power stems from the general-performance variable. Table 7 presents the results of regression and probit analyses using specific-performance variables. Having several specific-performance measures makes it possible to determine which, if any, area of perform ance was most important. The beta weights suggest that evaluations of Carter's foreign-policy performance were of more consequence than evaluations of his economic performance in eight primaries. In three pri maries, the dominant performance variable was Carter's handling of the Iranian hostage crisis; in five, it was his general handling of foreign pol icy. Economic performance appears to outweigh a foreign-policy per formance concern only in the 1980 California primary. A comparison of the beta weights shows that a specific performance variable had the strongest effect in every 1980 primary except Illinois, where electability and personal style outweighed two performance vari ables. That the effect of every specific performance variable in every pri mary was significant at .05 is additional support for the retrospective hy pothesis. The only other variables that were significant in four or more primaries are political role and ideology. Electability and personal style were significant in only three primaries; issue publics, party identifica tion, and SES, in only two primaries.
The comparison of probit models estimated with and without non performance factors again shows fairly conclusive results (bottom, Table  7 ). Only in Illinois do non-performance factors add as much as five per centage points in predictive power. In four primaries non-performance factors improve predictive power by something less than one percentage point. In Pennsylvania non-performance factors appear to make predic tive power slightly worse. The average improvement for these nine 1980 Democratic primaries is only 1.4 points; the average improvement for all thirteen primaries, only 1.6 points. Thus, if successfully predicting pri mary votes were the sole objective, non-performance factors could be ig nored without impairing the rate of predictability achieved with just per formance factors.
Conclusions
The seeds of Ford's 1976 defeat and of Carter's 1980 defeat were planted during their administrations, nurtured in divisive nomination contests, and harvested in general elections. The results reported here and elsewhere (Fiorina 1981) suggest that citizens who participated in 1976 and 1980 primary elections and in the 1976 and 1980 general elec tions seemed to respond "most markedly and most clearly to those events [they had] experienced"-the incumbents' performance in office (Key 1966, 51) . In short, the evidence clearly suggests that primary voters are as likely to cast retrospective votes as are their fellow citizens in general elections.
Voters in general elections are subject to many environmental forces and have many considerations to ponder. Researchers have con ceived of some of these inputs as long-term forces because they seem to have a strong effect in every election. Others have been defined as short term, election-specific forces because their influence seems to vary from one election to the next (Asher 1988) .
Some students of primary elections have argued that candidate electability, a direct consequence of "momentum," is such a long-term or universal factor in presidential primaries (Bartels 1985 (Bartels , 1988 . The re sults of this study, however, suggest that electability is probably a pri mary-specific factor. Electability was significant in only four of twelve primaries and it had the strongest effect in only one primary.
Rather, the results clearly suggest that performance evaluations are a universal force in nomination contests of the party-in-power. Perform ance variables were not only significant in every primary but also had, with one exception, the strongest effects in every primary. Their predic tive power dramatically exceeded that of all other variables combined.
Moreover, the results show that leadership (i.e., political role) and ideology, although less significant than performance variables, also had significant effects more often than electability: leadership was significant in ten of thirteen primaries; ideology, in nine of thirteen. Since any elec tion is fundamentally an act of leadership selection, it makes sense for citizens who participate in that process to take into account "leadership ability." Ideology may function, like party identification, as a perceptual screen: an ideological identification may provide primary voters a con venient standard with which to judge candidates' policy proposals (Wat tier 1983b) . In short, the key determinants of candidate choice in the presidential primaries of the party-in-power seem to be evaluations of past performance, perceptions of the candidates' ability to perform (i.e., leadership traits), and expectations about the future direction of perform ance (i.e., ideology).
The results also suggest that candidate choice is affected by elec tion-specific factors (cf. Norrander 1986). Some plausible determinants of candidate choice-electability, party identification, policy issues, and personal style-are significant in only a few primaries. The results for issues are especially noteworthy because previous studies have found only limited effects for issues. These results, however, suggest that is sues do sometimes make a difference, particularly when effects are exam ined among voters grouped into issue publics. Perhaps these results will encourage other scholars to experiment with different measures of issue voting (cf. Asher 1988, ch. 4) . Open-ended questions that probe the saliency of issues and questions designed to measure voters' perceptions of candidate issue positions should be included in future studies. More evi dence on the effects of political issues, gathered in different settings with different techniques, is needed. 
